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Do Loyalty Programs Enhance Behavioral Loyalty? An Empirical 
Analysis Accounting for Program Design and Competitive Effects 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the effects of loyalty programs on share-of-wallet using market-
wide household panel data on supermarket purchases. We find that loyalty programs 
relate positively to share-of-wallet, but the programs differ in effectiveness and some 
are ineffective. Both a saving component and a multi-vendor structure enhance the 
effectiveness of a loyalty program, but high discounts do not lead to higher share-of-
wallets.  Further,  if  households  have  multiple  loyalty  cards,  the  effectiveness  of  a 
specific loyalty program is much smaller. The positive loyalty program effects on 
share-of-wallet entail substantial additional customer revenues. However, given the 
high number of loyalty programs already available in the market, our model predicts 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years many companies have introduced loyalty programs with the goal of 
improving customer loyalty and revenues. Loyalty programs are currently available in 
many  consumer  markets,  including  supermarkets,  gasoline  stations,  airlines,  and 
insurance companies. Loyalty programs provide members with rewards and additional 
value,  making  them  popular  among  consumers  (Liebermann  1999).  In  the  United 
States 70% of all households have at least one supermarket loyalty card (ACNielsen, 
Consumer insight 2000), in the Netherlands this is even 80% (GfK year guide 2000). 
Despite their popularity, it is not evident that loyalty programs stimulate customers’ 
buying with a company (Dowling and Uncles 1997).  
Existing  empirical  research  on  the  effects  of  loyalty  programs  on  buying 
behavior  reports  mixed  results.  Bolton,  Kannan,  and  Bramlett  (2000)  studied  the 
loyalty program of a credit card company, and found that members of the loyalty 
program  spend  more  than  non-members,  but  are  not  more  likely  to  retain  their 
accounts  over  time.  For  an  insurance  company,  Verhoef,  Franses,  and  Hoekstra 
(2001)  concluded  that  loyalty  program  members  are  more  likely  to  retain  their 
insurance  contracts  and  to  purchase  new  insurance  products  at  the  company.  But 
program  members  do  not  have  a  higher  customer  share,  defined  as  number  of 
insurance  contracts  with  the  company  divided  by  the  total  number  of  insurance 
products kept (Verhoef 2001). Sharp and Sharp (1997) used panel data to measure the 
effects of a retail loyalty program on buying patterns at the firm level. They found 
minor deviations from normal loyalty patterns as measured by Dirichlet model norms. 
Hence, some studies report positive effects of loyalty programs, whereas others find 
little to no effect.   4
A limitation of previous studies is that they lack information on customers’ 
memberships  of  competing  loyalty  programs.  Further,  most  existing  studies  use 
company purchase data, and have limited or no information on buying behavior at 
competitors.  Because  consumers  often  buy  from  different  companies  and  hold 
different competitive loyalty program memberships, usage of competitive information 
is important for a correct assessment of loyalty program effectiveness. Furthermore, 
each study is limited to one single loyalty program, but the effectiveness of loyalty 
programs  may  differ  due  to  program  design.  Recently,  futher  research  on  the 
effectiveness of loyalty programs has been called for (Jain and Singh 2002). In this 
paper  we  assess the effects of loyalty programs using data from an entire market 
rather than just one company, and contribute to existing literature in the following 
three ways. 
First,  we  account  for  the  effects  of  competitive  loyalty  programs.  Firms 
continuously work on improving their market position by differentiating themselves 
using new marketing instruments and strategies. But such differentiation is difficult to 
maintain  in  the  long  run,  because  successful  ideas  easily  trigger  competitive 
imitations.  As  a  consequence,  loyalty  programs  have  become  almost  common 
property in several industries in the past decades (Lewis 1997), and consumers are 
members  of  different  loyalty  programs  simultaneously  (Passingham  1998). 
Competitive reactions dampen the effects of marketing efforts, as has been shown for 
sales promotions by Leeflang and Wittink (2001). We will extend previous research 
on  loyalty  programs  by  exploring  to  what  extent  competitive  loyalty  programs 
influence each other’s effectiveness via multiple memberships.  
Second,  we  study  the  influence  of  differences  in  loyalty  program  design. 
Under the collective term of a loyalty program, a wide range of programs operates   5
that differ on several dimensions. Loyalty programs differ in the degree to which they 
give  discounts,  have  a  saving  program,  and  are  based  on  cooperation  with  other 
companies. Some experimental literature exists on the effects of design elements of 
saving schedules (Van Osselaer and Alba 2001) and reward characteristics (Kivetz 
and Simonson 2002). The exact design of the loyalty program might be an important 
determinant of its successfulness (O’Brien and  Jones 1995). To our knowledge,  a 
study on the relation between loyalty program design and behavioral loyalty in a real 
market setting is lacking, and our study aims to fill part of this gap. 
Finally,  we  examine  loyalty  program  effects  on  individual-level  share-of-
wallet, as a measure of behavioral loyalty. Data analyzed at the aggregate level (e.g. 
Sharp and Sharp 1997) may mask the individual-level effects of loyalty programs. For 
example, differences in effectiveness between households may arise because some 
households have competitive loyalty program memberships. Further, share-of-wallet, 
being the expenditures at a specific store as a fraction of total category expenditures, 
is a more relevant variable than the absolute value of the expenditures in measuring 
loyalty (Berger et al. 2001). Only absolute expenditures are available when studying 
the purchase data of a  single company, and have therefore been used  in previous 
research. But expenditure levels at a single company are insufficiently informative, 
because they can relate to high share-of-wallet and to high category expenditures. 
These high category expenditures do not necessarily represent high loyalty, since they 
may  also  be  due  to  exogenous  differences  between  households  (e.g.  family  size). 
Because it is the share of these expenditures that matters, we use share-of-wallet.  
In  our  study  we  use  household  panel  data  from  the  Dutch  supermarket 
industry. Seven of the twenty largest Dutch supermarket chains use loyalty programs. 
These  programs  vary  in  their  rewarding  mechanisms  and  cooperation  with  other   6
companies.  For  1999  households,  we  have  information  on  buying  behavior  and 
loyalty program memberships in all twenty supermarket chains during a two-and-a-
half  years period. Substantial overlap of loyalty program memberships  exists, and 
about 50% of the households have multiple memberships. We use a Tobit-II model to 
assess  the  effects  of  loyalty  programs  on  buying  behavior.  The  Tobit-II  model 
includes a selection equation for supermarket choice, and an attraction specification 
for  share-of-wallet.  The  independent  variable  of  key  interest  is  loyalty  program 
membership, but we control for relevant marketing-mix factors of supermarket chains, 
and  socio-demographic  characteristics  of  panel  households.  We  find  that  loyalty 
programs  relate  positively  to  share-of-wallet,  but  the  programs  differ  widely  in 
effectiveness, and some are even ineffective. Both a saving component and a multi-
vendor structure enhance the effectiveness of a loyalty program, but high discounts do 
not lead to higher share-of-wallets. Further, if households have multiple loyalty cards, 
the  effectiveness  of  an  individual  loyalty  program  is  much  smaller.  The  positive 
loyalty  program  effects  on  share-of-wallet  entail  substantial  additional  customer 
revenues. However, given the high number of loyalty programs already available in 
the market, our model predicts that a new loyalty program introduction will only lead 
to small effects on share-of-wallet.  
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  First,  we  develop  a 
conceptual framework on the relation between loyalty programs and buying behavior, 
and formulate several hypotheses. Second, we discuss the data of our empirical study. 
Then we describe the Tobit-II model used for the analysis, followed by a presentation 
of the results. We finish with conclusions and a discussion.  
   7
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Customer loyalty 
In mature markets, companies tend to shift their focus from attracting new customers 
to managing relations with existing customers. A central goal of customer relation 
management (CRM) is to improve customer loyalty. A consumer is loyal if s/he has a 
strong attitude to a certain supplier over its competitors (Oliver 1999, Dick and Basu 
1994). Attitudinal loyalty leads to loyal buying behavior and positive word-of-mouth 
(Reichheld and Sasser 1990). Hence, loyalty leads to higher revenues and shields a 
company from competitive actions, which makes a loyal customer base a valuable 
asset in competitive markets (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 2000). 
Companies  want  to  use  the  marketing-mix  to  improve  customer  loyalty. 
Providing good value for money enhances customer loyalty (Sirohi, McLaughlin, and 
Wittink 1998, Rust, Zeithaml, and Lemmon 2000). In addition, relational instruments 
such  as  loyalty  programs,  personal  treatment,  and  direct  mails  specifically  aim to 
improve  customer  loyalty  in  mass  markets  (DeWulf,  Odekerken-Schröder,  and 
Iacobucci 2001). These investments in loyalty management are especially important if 
consumers face low switching costs, because they are not locked in by a contract or 
product technique (Shapiro and Varian 2000). In many consumer markets including 
retailing,  consumers  are  often  regular  buyers  at  different  companies  (Kahn  and 
McAlister  1997),  a  phenomenon  referred  to  as  polygamous  loyalty  (Dowling  and 
Uncles 1997). 
In assessing the effectiveness of relational instruments, share-of-wallet plays 
an important role as a measure of loyal buying behavior (Berger et al. 2001). Share-
of-wallet measures the percentage of total expenditures spent on purchases at a certain 
company. Share-of-wallet integrates choice behavior and transaction sizes during a   8
certain  time  period  into  one  single  measure,  and  expresses  the  degree  to  which  a 
consumer is loyal to one supplier. Another measure widely used in measuring the 
effects of relational investments is purchase quantity (Bolton, Kannan, and Bramlett 
2000, Verhoef, Franses, and Hoekstra 2001). A major disadvantage of this measure is 
that  purchase  quantity  is  the  product  of  share-of-wallet  and  total  category 
expenditures, the latter being to a large extent exogenously determined by e.g. socio-
demographic  characteristics.  Hence,  a  high  purchase  quantity  does  not  necessarily 
reflect high behavioral loyalty, and we therefore choose the share-of-wallet to be our 
dependent variable.  
Loyalty programs 
In  line  with  previous  research  (e.g.  Sharp  and  Sharp  1997,  Bolton,  Kannan,  and 
Bramlett 2000), we define a loyalty program as an integrated system of marketing 
actions, which aims to make member customers more loyal. A customer must become 
member  and  identify  as  such  at  every  purchase,  to  take  advantage  of  the  loyalty 
program. We expect that loyalty program members show more loyal buying behavior 
compared to two reference groups, namely relative to non-member customers of the 
same company, and relative to customers of a company without a loyalty program.  
First, consumers that become members of the loyalty program are likely to 
identify more strongly with the company, because the membership relates them to a 
group of privileged customers (Bhattacharya, Rao, and Glynn 1995, Oliver 1999). 
Consumers identify with many groups, such as with their nation or the company they 
work for. In general, the identification with commercial organizations seems to be 
intensifying due to the growing centrality of consumption and materialistic desires in 
society  (Muniz  and  O’Guinn  2001,  Fournier  1998).  Social  identity  research  (e.g., 
Tajfel  1978)  has  shown  that  subjects  already  feel  group  identification  if  they  are   9
randomly appointed to a group of subjects (the so-called minimal group paradigm). 
Since most loyalty programs use loyalty cards that members carry with them and have 
to show at each transaction with the company, this explicit token of membership will 
strengthen their sense of belonging to the company and thus enhance the identification 
effect.  Social  identity  studies  (Tajfel,  1978)  also  showed  that  group  identification 
motivates  members  to  display  positive  behavior  towards  the  group  (in-group 
favoritism). Similarly, organizational identification appears to lead to higher loyalty 
of employees (Smidts, Pruyn, and Riel 2001) and more loyal behavior of members of 
non-profit organizations (Bhattacharya 1998). Therefore, we expect that customers 
stronger identify with a company and become more loyal if they are members of the 
loyalty program. 
Second, loyalty programs give rewards to members, varying from saving for 
items and targeted offers, to special shopping nights and preferred service treatment. 
The marketing activities within the loyalty program reward and stimulate customer 
loyalty  by  providing  either  social  or  economic  value.  For  example,  a  members’ 
relational  magazine  hardly  provides  economic  value,  but  it  stimulates  customers’ 
feelings of belonging and being treated special (O’Brien and Jones 1995). Economic 
rewards such as saving programs and discounts give specific behavioral incentives, 
but could make consumers calculative and create just spurious loyalty (Dick and Basu 
1994).  However,  DeWulf,  Odekerken-Schröder,  and  Iacobucci  (2001)  show  for 
relational investments in consumer-firm relationships the existence of a reciprocity 
norm:  customers  evoke  obligation  towards  those  who  treat  them  well  or  provide 
value. Because of these two mechanisms we expect that loyalty program members 
show more loyal buying behavior than both reference groups of non-members, and we 
hypothesize:   10
H1a:  A customer who is a loyalty program member has a higher share-of-wallet 
with this company than a non-program member has with this company. 
H1b:  A customer who is a loyalty program member has a higher share-of-wallet 
with  this  company  than  a  customer  of  a  company  without  a  loyalty 
program has with his/her company. 
 
Loyalty Program Design 
The effectiveness of a loyalty program is likely to depend on its design (Dowling and 
Uncles 1995, Jain and Singh 2000). We consider three key design aspects of loyalty 
programs that we expect to influence effectiveness: saving component, discount rate, 
and multi-vendor structure.  
Saving component 
Saving programs have received most attention in the literature, since they provide 
very transparent loyalty incentives. Saving programs have been studied both from an 
empirical  observational  perspective  (Sharp  and  Sharp  1997,  Bolton,  Kannan,  and 
Bramlett 2001), from an experimental perspective (Kivetz and Simonson 2002, Van 
Osselaer and Alba 2001), and from an industrial organizational perspective (Kopalle, 
Neslin and Shingh 2000, Zhang, Krishna and Dhar 2000). A saving program gives 
customers saving points, dependent on the monetary amount spent at the company. A 
program member can redeem his points for a reward, such as a free product, after s/he 
has reached the minimal redeeming threshold. This threshold is such that the customer 
must  repatronage  for  some  time.  Hence,  a  saving  component  offers  incentives  to 
spend a high share-of-wallet at the company during some period of time. Though the 
economic value of saving points is often low, experimental research has shown that 
consumers  overvalue  saving  points  (Hsee  2000),  and  show  stronger  behavioral 
reactions to saving points than rationally expected. We therefore hypothesize: 
H2a:   Loyalty  programs  without  a  saving  component  are  less  effective  in 
enhancing share-of-wallet than loyalty programs with a saving component.   11
 
Price Discounts 
Many  loyalty  programs  give  price  discounts  on  promoted  items.  Consumers 
appreciate these discounts since they represent direct rewards and are linked to the 
core product (Liebermann 1999, Dowling and Uncles 1997). Most companies print 
the consumer’s received discounts on the receipt, and loyalty program members may 
evaluate these discounts as a reward of their loyalty (Mulhern and Padgett 1995). 
However, price promotions have a direct negative effect on share-of-wallet because of 
the  price  reduction  provided  to  consumers.  This  negative  effect  must  at  least  be 
compensated by an increase in volume sales. 
Mulhern  and  Padgett  (1995)  found  that  consumers  who  bought  promoted 
items but did not visit the store for this reason, purchased more on their shopping trips 
than consumers who bought nothing on promotion. Fox, Montgomery, and Lodish 
(2001) found a small positive effect of promotion intensity on purchase quantities 
over a two  years observation period. Hoch, Drèze, and Purk (1994) found from a 
16-week experiment that both sales and profits increase with the number of promoted 
items, regardless of the pricing format of the supermarket chain. Given the results of 
existing literature, we expect that the positive effects of price discounts outweigh the 
negative effects. 
H2b:  Higher price discounts on loyalty programs enhance share-of-wallet.  
 
Multi-vendor structure 
Some companies have a loyalty program in cooperation with companies from other 
industries with non-overlapping product offerings. In general, companies cooperate to 
exchange resources for mutual benefit, such as enhanced product value and market 
reputations, and access to new markets and information (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993).   12
If a consumer becomes a member of a multi-vendor loyalty program, s/he benefits 
from the program at all participating companies. E.g. at each company a consumer 
receives  saving  points,  and  members  can  potentially  save  credit  points  quicker. 
Because  the  program  has  a  wider  application  than  single-vendor  programs,  a 
consumer is likely to be higher involved with the program and more aware of the 
incentives and benefits provided. Further, participating companies can benefit from 
each other’s reputation, especially if a consumer is loyal to one of the companies, but 
not yet to another. We therefore hypothesize: 
H2c:   Multi-vendor  programs  are  more  effective  in  enhancing  share-of-wallet 
than single-vendor programs. 
 
Competitive effects 
A consumer can easily be member of different loyalty programs. We expect that the 
effects of a loyalty program are smaller if a household also holds competitive loyalty 
programs  memberships.  Social  identity  theory  suggests  that  people  often  retain 
multiple, loosely coupled identities (Ashforth and Mael 1989). But the more different 
companies a consumer visits in the same industry, the lower the intensity with which 
s/he identifies with any of these organizations (Bhattacharya, Rao, and Glynn 1995). 
From  a  rewarding  perspective,  the  relative  attractiveness  of  an  individual  loyalty 
program  diminishes  because  consumers  find  similar  incentives  from  different 
programs. We hypothesize:  
H3:  The more competitive loyalty program memberships a consumer holds, the 
smaller the positive effect of a loyalty program on share-of-wallet. 
 
We test the hypotheses in a research framework as represented in Figure 1. To infer 
unbiased  loyalty  program  effects,  we  control  for  relevant  store  and  household 
variables. We use the most important store variables in retailing: location, price, and 
assortment/store surface (Kahn and MacAlister 1997). Different socio-demographic   13
groups might appreciate these store characteristics differently, and we account for this 
by letting the store characteristic effects depend on household size and income. 
 [Insert FIGURE 1 about here] 
 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
To  test  the  hypotheses,  we  conduct  an  empirical  study  on  the  Dutch  supermarket 
industry. Consumers make transactions in supermarkets frequently, and face only low 
switching  costs,  which  makes  it  an  appropriate  market  to  study  loyalty  programs 
(Shapiro and Varian 2000). 
  We  have  panel  data  on  buying  behavior  of  1999  Dutch  households  in 
supermarkets during 2.5 years. The panel members provide purchase information by 
scanning  all  their  supermarket  receipts  with  a  home  scanner.  The  data  cover  the 
period  July  1998  until  December  2000,  and  have  been  provided  by  GfK  Panel 
Services.  We  know  for  each  household  the  total  quarterly  expenditures  in  each 
supermarket  chain  during  these  ten  quarters.  We  use  data  on  expenditures  in  the 
largest twenty supermarket chains; these comprise 92.8% of the entire market sales.  
Seven of the twenty supermarket chains have loyalty programs, which all use 
loyalty cards for identification and registration. All loyalty programs but one have a 
saving component. Members must repatronage at least during a few months to reach a 
minimal redemption threshold, and exchange points for gifts or free products. Because 
only  one  loyalty  program  has  no  saving  component,  the  influence  of  the  saving 
component must be interpreted carefully. Typically, a loyalty program also provides 
discounts to cardholders via promoted items. Two loyalty programs are multi-vendor 
programs.  One  consists  of  a  cooperation  of  a  supermarket  chain  with  a  gasoline 
station, and the other concerns a cooperation of a supermarket chain with a wide range   14
of companies in different industries. This latter supermarket chain has in fact another 
loyalty  program  as  well:  a  single-vendor  discount  program.  Consumers  can  be 
member of either one or both of these programs. Both large and small supermarket 
chains  have  introduced  loyalty  programs,  and  some  of  the  largest  chains  in  the 
Netherlands do not have a loyalty program. 
Table  1  shows  the  several  loyalty  programs  with  their  designs,  the  market 
shares  of  the  supermarket  chains,  and  some  customer  base  characteristics.  The 
customer base of a supermarket chain consists of those households that visited the 
chain at least once during a certain quarter. Consumers visit on average 3.96 different 
supermarket chains per quarter (median = 4). On average, 78.1% of the customer base 
is loyalty program member, but this number varies between supermarket chains from 
67.3% (Integro) till 87.7% (Jan Linders).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Panel households fill in a yearly questionnaire in which they report on their loyalty 
program memberships of supermarkets. Most panel households did not change their 
loyalty  program  memberships  during  the  observation  period,  but  some  of  the 
households entered or quitted a loyalty program. About 88% of the panel households 
are  member  of  at  least  one  supermarket  loyalty  program.  The  duplication  rate  of 
loyalty program memberships is substantial: 33% of the panel households have two 
loyalty programs, 16% have three loyalty programs, and 4% have four or more loyalty 
programs.  On  average  a  household  holds  1.65  loyalty  program  memberships.  The 
questionnaires were yearly administered in January, and the information from each 
questionnaire is used for a full year period, starting six months before until six months 
after measurement. An extensive data collection took place to operate all variables, 
which we discuss below.   15
Dependent variable 
We measure buying behavior as the share-of-wallet in a supermarket chain during a 
specific quarter:  
SOWist =  Share-of-wallet of household i in store s during quarter t, 
i = 1, …, I; I = 1999  (households), 
s = 1,…, S; S = 20   (supermarket chains), 
t = 1,…, T; T = 10   (quarters). 
Independent variables: Loyalty programs 
Concerning loyalty program memberships, three situations are possible: 
1)  A supermarket chain has a loyalty program and the household is member of it; 
2)  A supermarket chain has a loyalty program but the household is not a member; 
3)  A supermarket chain does not have a loyalty program. 
We use two dummy variables to indicate the first two situations, and consider the last 
one as the base situation. If a household is a loyalty program member, the influence of 
the program is likely to depend on its design and on competitive loyalty program 
memberships. We let the main effect reflect a loyalty program with the most common 
design:  a  single  vendor  program  with  a  saving  component  offering  an  average 
discount rate, namely 3.8%. We account for design differences by including variables 
representing the absence of a saving component, deviations from the average discount 
rate,  and  existence  of  a  multi-vendor  structure.  Dutch  Consumer  Reports  (2000) 
measured discount rate by taking a sample of loyalty program members’ receipts and 
calculating the average obtained discount percentage. We also include the number of 
loyalty  program  memberships  in  other  supermarket  chains.  In  sum,  the  following 
loyalty program variables are introduced: 
LPMist =  1 if supermarket chain  s has  a loyalty program, and household i is   16
member during quarter t, 0 otherwise (situation 1);  
LPNMist =  1 if supermarket chain s has a loyalty program, but household i is not a 
member during quarter t, 0 otherwise (situation 2); 
NSAVs =  1  if  supermarket  chain  s  has  a  loyalty  program  without  saving 
component, 0 otherwise; 
DISCs =  Discount rate offered by the loyalty program of supermarket chain s 
minus average discount rate on a loyalty program;  
MVs =   1  if  supermarket  chain  s  has  a  loyalty  program  with  multi-vendor 
structure, 0 otherwise; 
LPMCist =   The number of supermarket chains of which a household i is loyalty 
program member in quarter t, except for supermarket chain s itself. 
Independent variables: Store characteristics 
We  include  the  store  characteristics  location,  price  level,  and  store  surface  as 
independent  variables  in  our  model.  We  obtained  the  number  of  outlets  of  a 
supermarket chain in each of the twelve provinces of the Netherlands in 2000 from 
Elsevier Business Information. Some supermarket chains are exclusively located in a 
limited number of provinces, while others are countrywide located. For each province, 
we measure distribution density as the number of outlets of a supermarket chain as a 
fraction of the sum of outlets over all chains. We apply this measure to an individual 
household, based on its province of residence.  
We use Dutch Consumer Reports to determine the price level of supermarket 
chains. The Dutch Consumer Association compares the price of a fixed basket across 
supermarket chains except for discounters, with a sample of five outlets per chain. Six 
price measurements are available for the observation period, and for each quarter we 
use the measurement most close in time. We construct a categorical price variable   17
with three levels (low, medium, high), where all levels include the same number of 
stores. The three discounters are coded as low priced.  
We use the average store surface of a supermarket chain, as reported yearly in 
the  ACNielsen  Vademecum.  We  use  the  measurement  most  close  to  the  relating 
quarter. Store surface is positively related to assortment width and shopping space 
(Arnold, Oum, and Tigert 1983). We use the natural logarithm of store surface in our 
model  to  obtain  an  approximately  normal  store  surface  distribution.  In  sum,  we 
introduce the following set of store characteristics: 
DENSist =   Number of outlets of supermarket chain s as fraction of total number of 
supermarket  outlets,  in  province  of  residence  of  household  i  during 
quarter t; 
PHst =    1 if supermarket chain s is high-priced during quarter t, 0 otherwise; 
PLst =    1 if supermarket chain s is low-priced during quarter t, 0 otherwise; 
SURFst =  Natural logarithm of average store surface of supermarket chain s in 
period t. 
Independent variables: Household characteristics 
We have socio-demographic information on household size and net household income 
of panel members. The socio-demographic variables are measured as deviations from 
the  sample  average,  and  included  in  the  model  as  moderators  of  the  store 
characteristics.  In  this  way  the  main  effect  of  a  store  characteristic  measures  the 
effects for an average household. So we introduce: 
HHSIZEit =  Number of persons in household i in quarter t minus average number 
of persons in a household; 
HHINCit =  Monthly  income  in  1,000  Euros  of  household  i  in  quarter  t  minus 
average monthly household income.    18
 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
A model on the effects of loyalty programs on share-of-wallet yields some challenges. 
To be logically consistent, the model must produce estimates between 0 and 1 (range 
constraint), and the sum of estimates over all stores must equal 1 (sum constraint) 
(Hanssens, Parsons and Schultz 2001, p.121). Because a linear regression model does 
not meet these constraints, we use an attraction model instead. Attraction models have 
been widely used for modeling market shares (Leeflang et al. 2000, p.171), but can 
also be applied to household-level share-of-wallets. The basic idea is that the share-of-

















The attraction of a store Aist is a linear function of loyalty program membership and 
store characteristics. We include loyalty program design elements and competitive 
program memberships as moderators of the loyalty program effect, and household 
characteristics as moderators of store effects (see Figure 1). We specify the attraction 
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The attraction model is non-linear, and must be rewritten to enable estimation of the 
parameter coefficients. We use the method of log-centering (Nakanishi and Cooper 
1988), and obtain a log-linear specification from which we can estimate the parameter 
coefficients:  
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Another challenge is that the dependent variable share-of-wallet is zero in a large 
number of cases, because a household only chooses a limited number of supermarket 
chains. An attraction model does not allow for these zeros, because the attraction of a 
supermarket  chain  cannot  be  zero  (see  equation  (2)).  Analyzing  only  those 
observations with a positive share-of-wallet is not a good solution, because share-of-
wallet is positive conditional on the store being chosen. We expect that the factors that 
influence a household’s store choice influence the share-of-wallet of chosen stores as 
well. If we do not allow for this dependency, the parameter estimates of a model for 
share-of-wallet is likely to be biased (Thomas 2001). Therefore we need a model that 
combines both share-of-wallet and store choice. 
We introduce a selection variable CHOICEist that indicates whether store s is 
in the choice set of household i during quarter t. We assume that a consumer chooses 
to  visit  a  supermarket  chain  (CHOICEist=1)  if  the  underlying  utility 
*
ist CHOICE is   20
positive. We let 
*
ist CHOICE  be linearly dependent on the same set of explanatory 
variables as used for the attraction function (see equations (2)-(4)). We combine store 
choice and attraction in a Tobit-II model (Verbeek 2000, p.209), which consists of a 
selection equation (store choice model) and a quantity equation (attraction model), 
and has the following form:  
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The Tobit-II model is estimated with maximum likelihood; the likelihood function is 
presented  in  Appendix  A.  The  model  corrects  for  the  interrelation  between  store 
choice and share-of-wallet, because both decisions are integrated into one model. The 
model accounts for the fact that households differ in the number of stores they visit, 
because the share-of-wallet of a household is modeled as the attraction of the specific 
store divided by the sum of the attractions of  the stores chosen by this particular 
household.  In  total  there  are  399,800  observations,  i.e.,  for  each  of  the  1999 
households  ten  quarterly  observations  are  available  for  each  of  the  twenty 
supermarket chains. Both the share-of-wallet and choice decisions are modeled with 
seventeen explanatory variables and a constant, leading to 36 response parameters. In 
addition, the (co)variance parameters s1 and s12 are estimated (see equation (9)). We   21
set the constraint s2 =1 to avoid identification problems (Verbeek 2000, p.208).  
 
RESULTS 
The Tobit-II model is overall highly significant ( 01 . , 56 . 6199
2 < = p c ), as are most 
individual variables in the model, even at 1%-significance level. The likelihood ratio 
test  of  independent  equations  is  rejected  ( 01 . , 3 . 16
2 < = p c ),  implying  that 
independent  estimation  of  the  selection  and  quantity  equations  would  have  led  to 
significant  biases.  The  pseudo  R
2  of  the  model  is  .39,  calculated  as  proposed  by 
Laitila (1993). The coefficient parameter estimates of the model are reported in Table 
2. In the selection equation, distribution density has a strong positive influence on 
store choice. Store choice is also positively related to loyalty program membership. 
Since the store choice equation is merely included to obtain unbiased effect estimates 
for the share of wallet model, we focus on the discussion of the latter model ((1)-(4)). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
We find that a loyalty program membership relates positively to store attraction (left-
hand side Table 2). Store attraction is higher for a loyalty program member than for a 
non-program member in the same supermarket chain ( 01 . , 025 . 2 ˆ ˆ
3 1 , 2 < = - p b d ), as 
well  as  for  a  customer  of  a  supermarket  chain  without  loyalty  program 
( 01 . , 509 . ˆ
1 , 2 < = p d ). These  findings confirm Hypotheses 1a and  1b. Hypothesis  2 
tests if the relation between loyalty program membership and share-of-wallet depends 
on loyalty program design. For the loyalty program without saving component, the 
positive  effect  of  loyalty  program  membership  on  share-of-wallet  is  much  lower 
( 01 . , 338 . ˆ
2 , 2 < - = p d ). This finding is based on a comparison between seven loyalty 
programs with and one program without a saving component, but since the effect is   22
statistically significant and large in size, we confirm Hypothesis 2a. Higher discount 
rates do not significantly influence the store attraction of loyalty program members, so 
that  Hypothesis  2b  cannot  be  confirmed  ( 14 . , 008 . ˆ
3 , 2 = = p d ).  As  hypothesized, 
multi-vendor  programs  have  a  larger  effect  on  store  attraction  than  single-vendor 
programs ( 01 . , 089 . ˆ
4 , 2 < = p d , Hypothesis 2c). Competitive memberships dampen the 
positive  effects  of  loyalty  program  membership  on  store  attraction 
( 01 . , 139 . ˆ
5 , 2 < - = p d ,  Hypothesis  3).  Most  store  characteristics  and  their  socio-
demographic moderators have a significant impact on store attraction and have the 
expected signs. Only a low price level and its moderators with household size and 
income have no significant impact on store attraction, compared to a medium price 
level. In sum, our empirical analysis confirms all hypotheses, except for Hypothesis 
2b. 
Size of Loyalty Program Effects 
From the parameter estimates the magnitude of the effects are not directly apparent, 
because of the non-linear nature of the model. Further, the coefficients represent the 
effects  of  variables  on  attraction  and  not  on  share-of-wallet,  which  complicates 
interpretations. To obtain insight in the magnitude of the loyalty program effects, we 
do  simulations  for  a  representative  household,  and  for  each  customer  base  of  the 
supermarket chains. 
Simulations for a representative household 
We consider a representative household with average household size and income and 
compare model predictions by imputing sensible values for the explanatory variables. 
The household visits four supermarket chains per quarter, which is the median value 
for  the  panel  households.  We  assume  that  these  supermarket  chains  each  have  a   23
medium  price  level,  and  an  average  store  surface  and  distribution  density.  We 
calculate  the  household’s  predicted  share-of-wallet  for  different  loyalty  program 
scenarios, based on variations in design and competitive memberships. The results are 
presented in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
In the base scenario without loyalty programs, the four supermarket chains are equally 
attractive so that the predicted share-of-wallet is .25 for each chain. If one of the 
supermarket chains has a loyalty program and the household is member, the predicted 
share-of-wallet increases as shown in the first column of Table 3. For an average 
loyalty program the predicted share-of-wallet increases to .36. The share-of-wallet is 
highest if it concerns a multi-vendor saving program (.38), and much lower for a 
program without saving component (.28). On the other hand, if a supermarket chain 
has a loyalty program but the household holds no membership, the predicted share-of-
wallet is only 0.07. 
The second and third columns of Table 3 represent situations in which the 
household holds respectively one and two competitive memberships. Comparison of 
the cells within a row shows a negative impact of competitive memberships on the 
predicted share-of-wallet. For an average loyalty program membership, the predicted 
share-of-wallet  decreases  from  .36  to  .32  and  .29  when  the  household  holds 
respectively one and two competitive memberships. For a multi-vendor program this 
is from .38 to .35 and .30, and for a loyalty program without saving component this is 
from  .28  to  .26  and  .25.  For  a  loyalty  program  without  saving  component,  the 
predicted share-of-wallet of a member with competitive memberships is about the 
same as for a customer of a supermarket without loyalty program. This analysis for a 
representative household shows that the loyalty program effect depends strongly on   24
program design, and that the effect also differs between program members because of 
the competitive memberships they hold.  
Simulations for supermarkets’ customer bases 
To obtain better insight in the loyalty program effects at the supermarket level, we 
consider the entire customer base of each supermarket chain s. We now perform what-
if  simulations  for  the  existing  households  in  the  database,  unlike  in  previous 
simulations that were done for a hypothetical, representative household. In attraction 
models better insight into effect sizes is often obtained by calculating the elasticities 
(e.g. Campo et al. 2000). However, dummy variables such as used for loyalty program 
membership can only take the values 0/1, so that we cannot calculate elasticities for 
our key variables of interest. Instead, we compare model predictions for the present 
situation (supermarket has a loyalty program) with the fictive situation in which the 
supermarket chain does not have a loyalty program.  
We calculate the model predictions for the latter situation adapting all relevant 
loyalty program related variables. We account for both loyalty program members and 
non-members of a supermarket chain, because a non-program member has a lower 
predicted  share-of-wallet  than  an  average  customer  of  a  chain  without  a  loyalty 
program  (see  Table  3).  So  these  model  predictions  represent  the  situation  of  a 
comparable chain in terms of marketing mix and customer base, but without a loyalty 
program. Table 4 presents the effects of loyalty programs on average share-of-wallet 
and customer revenues per supermarket chain. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Our  findings  indicate  that  the  share-of-wallet  of  a  company’s  customer  base  is 
positively related to the presence of a loyalty program. For most supermarket chains 
the average predicted share-of-wallet of customers is higher if a loyalty program is   25
available. On average, the share-of-wallet of the customer base is 0.02 or 5.3% higher 
compared to a situation without loyalty program. But between supermarket chains the 
effects differ between 11.3% and –3.8%, and for two loyalty programs the predicted 
share-of-wallets are lower than in a situation without loyalty program. Factors that 
explain these differences are: loyalty program design, competitive memberships, the 
membership rate, and the attractiveness of the store arising from other marketing-mix 
variables.  
First,  loyalty  program  designs  differ  in  the  presence  of  a  multi-vendor 
structure and a saving component. The loyalty programs with multi-vendor structure 
(Airmiles  and  Rocks)  both  positively  relate  to  share-of-wallet.  Compared  to  the 
average  loyalty  program  effect  of  5.3%,  Rocks  has  a  larger  effect  than  average 
(5.9%), and Airmiles a smaller effect (2.7%). Hence, the positive effect of a multi-
vendor structure at the household level (controlling for other covariates) is only partly 
apparent  at  the  chain  level.  The  explanation  is  that  these  other  covariates  differ 
systematically between chains. For example, if a chain is already relatively attractive 
without  loyalty  program  the  marginal  effect  of  a  loyalty  program  membership on 
share-of-wallet is smaller (Hanssens, Parsons, and Schultz 2000, p.124). This applies 
particularly for the Airmiles card from Albert Heijn, a chain that has both a large store 
surface  and  a  high  distribution  density.  The  loyalty  program  without  saving 
component (Bonuscard) has only  a weak positive influence on predicted share-of-
wallet (2.5%), which confirms findings at the household level. 
Second, loyalty program effectiveness depends on the number of competitive 
memberships the chain’s program members hold as shown clearly on household level. 
Konmar has customers with the largest number of competitive cards on average (1.86) 
and its program is indeed very ineffective.    26
Third,  the  most  important  factor  of  the  effectiveness  differences  is  the 
membership rate of the customer base, being the percentage of customers who are 
loyalty program members. If customers are no loyalty program members, they miss 
all rewards and services offered by the program, which could potentially build up 
loyalty. The most effective loyalty program (Edah Card) has a high membership rate 
(85.6% vs. 80.0% average). The program with worst performance (Konmar card) has 
a membership rate of the loyalty program of only 68.8%.  
Finally, loyalty program effectiveness depends on the attraction of the store in 
the base situation without loyalty program. We already observed that for the Airmiles 
card of Albert Heijn, but it also applies for Konmar that has a large store surface. 
Though our measure of effect size is coarse (we predict share-of-wallets for 
the fictive situation of the absence of loyalty card), it indicates that loyalty programs 
on average enhance the share-of-wallet of a company’s customer base. However, we 
also see that the loyalty program  effect depends on a  complex of factors such as 
program design and membership rate.  
Customer Revenues 
Next to share-of-wallet, it is relevant to know how loyalty programs affect customer 
revenues.  Additional  revenues  depend  on  the  loyalty  program  effect  on  share-of-
wallet,  but  also  on  category  expenditures.  Table  4  shows  the  average  additional 
revenue  per  customer  for  each  supermarket  chain.  On  average  a  loyalty  program 
relates  to  ¼  DGGLWLRQDO UHYHQXH SHU FXVWRPHU SHU \HDU EXW DJDLQ VWURQJ
differences  exist  between  supermarket  chains.  Overall,  loyalty  programs  that  are 
effective in terms of share-of-wallet show large revenue effects as well, but minor 
deviations  exist.  The  multi-vendor  programs  show  additional  customer  revenues 
below  average  (resp.  ¼  DQG ¼ .89).  The  loyalty  program  without  saving   27
component (Bonuscard) enhances customer revenues with ¼7KHODUJHVWHIIHFW
is  ¼  &223 &OXE-Card) and the lowest  ¼–30.09 (Konmar card). Hence, an 
analysis of customer revenues provides retailers insight into financial attractiveness of 
individual  loyalty  programs.  To  further  calculate  the  profitability  of  a  loyalty 
program, we would need (to us unavailable) information on operation costs of the 
program. 
Loyalty Program Introductions 
Supermarket  chains  without  a  loyalty  program  might  consider  a  loyalty  program 
introduction. Our model can predict the effects of such an introduction for each of the 
thirteen  chains  without  a  loyalty  program.  We  calculate  for  all  supermarkets  the 
predicted  effects  of  loyalty  program  introduction,  assuming  that  the  new  loyalty 
program realizes a membership rate equal to the current average rate (80.0%). Table 5 
presents the results for four arbitrary non-loyalty program supermarket chains, and the 
average effect for all thirteen chains.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
A  new  loyalty  program  will  lead  on  average  to  an  increase  of  .004  or  1.7%  on 
predicted  share-of-wallet,  and  ¼  RQ UHYHQXHV 7KHVH HIIHFWV DUH FRQVLGHUDEO\
lower than for the present loyalty programs, because many loyalty program members 
are  already  member  of  competitive  programs.  Further,  given  the  high  number  of 
loyalty programs already in the market, a new loyalty program might find difficulty in 
realizing a membership rate equal to the current average rate (80%), which further 
diminishes effectiveness. In sum, our simulations indicate that it is doubtful if chains 
without a loyalty program should introduce one, given the high number of loyalty 
programs in the current market.  
    28
CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of our study is to obtain better insight in the effectiveness of loyalty 
programs.  We  achieve  this  by  studying  a  whole  market  and  accounting  for 
competitive effects and loyalty program design. We find that loyalty programs have 
on average a positive influence on share-of-wallet (H1), but loyalty programs differ 
widely in effectiveness (H2 and H3).  
In the first place, differences in loyalty program effectiveness relate to loyalty 
program design. Loyalty programs only lead to appreciable effects on share-of-wallet 
if the program has a saving component (H2a). Though saving points represent often 
only low economic value, experimental studies have shown that saving points clearly 
stimulate  the  perception  of  saving  (Hsee  2000).  We  proved  the  existence  of  this 
phenomenon in a real market setting as well. Though customers appreciate discounts 
(Dowling and Uncles 1997, Liebermann 1999), the discount rate on loyalty programs 
does  not  affect  share-of-wallet  (H2b  not  confirmed).  A  multi-vendor  structure 
improves customer loyalty to a larger extent than a single-vendor program (H2c). This 
finding is in contrast with the suggestion of Sharp and Sharp (1997) that multi-vendor 
programs  might  be  less  effective,  because  they  reward  customers  too  easily. 
Apparently  a  multi-vendor  structure  improves  customer’s  involvement  in  the 
program. 
Second,  a  loyalty  program  is  less  effective  if  consumers  have  competitive 
loyalty  program  memberships  (H3),  because  these  consumers  might  identify  less 
strongly  with  an  individual  company  and  use  the  best  rewards  from  each  loyalty 
program. With this finding, we extend previous research of competitive effects (e.g. 
Leeflang  and  Wittink  2001)  by  showing  that  competitive  decisions  also  relate  to 
loyalty program effectiveness, via multiple memberships of consumers.   29
A third reason for differences in effectiveness is the membership rate of the 
loyalty  program.  A  low  percentage  of  customers  being  loyalty  program  members, 
implies that many customers are not exposed to the loyalty incentives given by a 
loyalty  program.  We  demonstrate  that  loyalty  program  introductions  can  only  be 
successful if they realize a sufficiently high membership rate, which may be hard if 
many customers already hold loyalty program memberships.  
In our study we used share-of-wallet as a measure of loyalty. We found that 
loyalty programs lead to a 0.02 or 5.3% increase of share-of-wallet on average. We 
used  the  effects  on  share-of-wallet  to  calculate  the  implications  for  revenues,  and 
found an average positive effect of ¼SHUFXVWRPHUSHU\HDU 
Finally, our analyses show the importance of household level analyses. Some 
loyalty program aspects could be masked with a study on aggregate level. E.g. the 
positive effect of a multi-vendor structure appears both from the parameter estimates 
(Table 2) and the simulations for a representative household (Table 3). However, in 
the simulations for an entire supermarket’s customer base, the effectiveness of the 
multi-vendor  program  turned  out  to  be  lower  than  average,  because  other  factors 
counterbalance the positive effect (Table 4). This might explain why Sharp and Sharp 
(1997)  found  very  small  effects  of  a  multi-vendor  loyalty  program.  Our  study 
illustrates that household level data analysis can clarify aspects that are masked at the 




The results of this study could help managers to improve their decisions concerning 
loyalty programs. A company (re)considering the use of a loyalty program should   30
realize that loyalty programs are overall effective in enhancing share-of-wallet, but 
not  in  each  individual  case.  First  of  all,  loyalty  program  design  influences 
effectiveness, and a company should carefully decide on this. A saving component 
gives explicit loyalty incentives by rewarding loyal members best. Our analyses show 
that  a  saving  component  enhances  effectiveness  considerably.  Further,  a  company 
should  consider  cooperation  with  (non-supermarket)  partners,  to  make  the  loyalty 
program an attractive entity to consumers, especially because the consumer’s wallet 
includes many loyalty cards already. A company should try to find a partner with 
comparable organizational capabilities and preferably one with which a prior history 
of business relations exists (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993).  
  Second, our analyses showed the importance of a high membership rate. A 
company  should  stimulate  regular  customers  to  become  members  of  the  loyalty 
program, because non-members lack the loyalty incentives of the program. Further, a 
critical mass of consumers in the loyalty program stimulates word-of-mouth among 
customers about loyalty program benefits. In-store communications, such as flyers, 
displays  and  personnel  communication  of  check-out  employees  should  reach 
customers who are not loyalty program members yet.  
  Third, competitive loyalty program memberships are an important concern for 
loyalty  program  effectiveness.  Shapiro  and  Varian  (2000)  considered  loyalty 
programs as a means to lock-in consumers in markets where switching costs are low. 
But this lock-in mechanism loses effectiveness if different loyalty programs lock-in 
the same consumer. Though not under its direct control, a company should try to 
avoid multiple memberships among its customers. By providing rewards especially 
attractive  for  loyal  customers  and  avoiding  rewards  that  stimulate  cherry  picking 
behavior such as price discounts, a supermarket chain could avoid the existence of too   31
many  duplicate  memberships.  Supermarkets  considering  a  loyalty  program 
introduction  should  realize  that  many  customers  already  hold  loyalty  program 
memberships. A clear inspection of competitors and their loyalty programs could help 
a manager to assess whether a loyalty program could be effective.  
Limitations and Further Research  
We undertook a market wide study of all loyalty programs in the Dutch supermarket 
industry and found overall positive effects of loyalty programs on share-of-wallet. 
Given that the relationship proneness and product category involvement of consumers 
is  low  in  this  industry,  we  could  expect  these  effects  to  be  even  larger  in  other 
industries, such as clothing retailing (De Wulf, Odekerken-Schröder, and Iaccobucci 
2001).  
  In our study we focused on loyalty programs as a means of improving loyal 
behavior, but we did not consider that a motivation of introducing loyalty programs 
could  be  to  obtain  purchase  data  (Day  2000).  A  loyalty  program  provides  the 
company with full information of customers’ buying behavior, and could be enriched 
with  socio-demographics  and  causal  information  such  as  price  promotions.  Rossi, 
McCulloch, and Allenby (1996) show a high value of using this information for target 
marketing,  e.g.  providing  coupons  to  certain  customer  groups.  Such  a  strategy  of 
direct marketing fulfills customer needs more specifically, so that marketing money is 
spent more efficiently.  
Further, we studied the effects of loyalty programs but did not consider its 
costs. The operation of a loyalty program involves various costs, on which we had no 
information.  The  costs  of  rewarding  members  differ  between  loyalty  programs, 
because of differences in loyalty program design and usage intensity of the loyalty 
program  by  members.  To  make  a  balanced  choice  on  loyalty  program  design  a   32
company should account for these cost differences. 
Overall, our research shows that loyalty programs positively affect share-of-
wallet, but the effectiveness depends strongly on loyalty program design, competitive 
memberships, and customer base characteristics. Several opportunities exist to study 
loyalty  programs  further,  such  as  the  effectiveness  of  loyalty  programs  in  other 
industries, the use of obtained loyalty card data, and relative profitability compared to 
other relational instruments.   33
TABLE 1 
Information on Supermarket Chains with a Loyalty program 
Loyalty Program  Market Share  
(in 2000) 
 
Customer Base Characteristics 

















































































































* Overall 83.6% of Albert Heijn’s customers are loyalty program member, and 21.4% of the customers are members of both programs.  
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TABLE 2 
Results of Tobit-II model 
ATTRACTION (Share-of-wallet)  CHOICE   
Explanatory Variable:    Parameter 
Estimate 




Single-vendor Saving Program  
+ No Saving function 
+ Discount rate 
+ Multi-vendor program 
# Competitive memberships 
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Price Low (PL) 












































































   
** p<.01 * p<.05   35
TABLE 3 
Share-of-wallet of a customer for different loyalty program situations 






Design  0 
 
1  2 
No  No 
 
Not applicable  .25  .24  .22 
Yes  No  Not relevant  .07 
 
.06  .06 
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TABLE 4 
Average Changes in Share-of-Wallet and Revenues Of the Customer Base 
Due to Loyalty Program 
    DSOW  DRevenue 
Supermarket 
Chain 
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TABLE 5 
The Effectiveness of a Loyalty Program Introduction  








Change in  
Share-of-Wallet 
 
% Change in 
Share-of-Wallet 
 


















































-  Distribution Density 
-  Price Level 









-  Household Size 
-  Household Income 
Design Characteristics: 
-  Saving Component (H2a) 
-  Multi-Vendor Structure (H2b) 








The likelihood of the model is (Verbeek 2000, p.211): 
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The expressions for the components of the likelihood-function are shown in equations 
A2-A4. 
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Source  Obtained data 




Dutch Consumer Reports 2000 
 
 
Dutch Consumer Reports 1998-2000 
 
Elsevier Business Information 2000 
 
 
ACNielsen Vademecum 1998-2000 
 
GfK yearguide 2000 
 
 
ACNielsen Consumer Insight 2000 
 
Buying  behavior  of  Dutch  households  in 
supermarkets, loyalty  program memberships 
and socio-demographics of the households 
 
Provided  Discount  Rate  of  Dutch 
Supermarket Loyalty Programs 
 
Price Level Dutch Supermarket Chains 
 
Outlet  Locations  of  Dutch  Supermarket 
Chains 
 
Outlet sizes of Dutch Supermarket Chains  
 
Loyalty Program Membership rate of Dutch 
households in supermarkets. 
  
Loyalty  Program  Membership  rate  of 
American households in supermarkets. 
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